On the relation between models and hypotheses and the role of heuristic hypotheses in the construction of scientific models by Gauderis, Tjerk
On the Relation Between Models and Hypotheses
and the Role of Heuristic Hypotheses
in the Construction of Scientific Models
Tjerk Gauderis




2. Some Conceptual Issues
3. Four Stances on the Relation Between Models and Hypotheses 
4. Three Cases from Astronomy
5. Heuristics and Fully Interpretable Hypotheses
6. The Role of Hypotheses in Model-Based Scientific Practice
7. Conclusion
ABSTRACT. In our understanding of model-based scientific practice, it
has become unclear what the role of hypotheses is. Many take mo-
dels and hypotheses to be more or less on the same footing; others
take hypotheses to be claims about the intended representational fea-
tures of models; some have even argued against the use of hypothe-
ses in model-based science. In this paper, I argue that the first and
third of these positions are untenable, while the second position ap-
plies only to a subclass of the many hypotheses actually employed in
model-based scientific practice, which I call fully interpretable
hypotheses. Next, I show, based on some case studies from astro-
nomy, that many scientific hypotheses are in fact of a different type,
which I call heuristic hypotheses. Therefore, I argue for a fourth po-
sition which complements the second position to provide an account
of the role of these two kinds of hypotheses in model-based scienti-
fic practice.
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Imagination creates events. 
(Giovanni Francesco Sagredo, 
letter to Galileo, 1612)
1.  Introduction
As a result of a shift in focus in the philosophy of science from dealing largely
with issues of scientific confirmation towards studying actual scientific prac-
tices and the questions they invoke, philosophical interest in the use of models
in science has steadily increased in recent decades. Although early interest was
mostly fueled by adherents of the so-called semantic and structuralist views of
theories,1 who tried to tailor their formal analyses towards the type of models
actually used by scientists, it is now recognized that the structural set-theore-
tical meaning of models is best not equivocated with the actual practices of
model-based science,2 which elicit many ontological and epistemological que-
stions in their own right. The study of these questions in relation to many ac-
tual scientific cases has led many, nowadays, to appreciate that much of scien-
ce can be adequately described as model-based science, which should not be
seen so much as a division between the various disciplines, but rather as a stra-
tegy that any discipline can employ to address theoretical scientific research
(Godfrey-Smith 2006). The construction, manipulation and refinement of mo-
dels are also now generally considered to be key scientific practices (Frigg and
Hartmann 2012). 
The recognition of the use of models in science has elicited a substantial
amount of research to clarify the relation between this rather new addition to
the jargon of scientific methodology and older inhabitants of this conceptual
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1 Until the 1970s, the received view of theories (also called the syntactic view) maintained
the Euclidean or Aristotelian ideal of a theory as a set of axioms and a suitable logic to infer all
true sentences in an ideal scientific language, supplemented with a set of correspondence rules
to link theoretical terms to empirical observations. The heavy language-dependency of this view
has led various scholars to develop the so-called semantic view of theories, in which theories are
equated with a class of models, abstract mathematical structures for which the theory was true
(Suppes 1960; Suppe 1977, 1989; Van Fraassen 1980). A related, structuralist view of scientific
theories was developed by, among others, Balzer, Moulines and Sneed (1987). For a recent pa-
per incorporating these structuralist ideas, see Leuridan (2013).
2 The two main arguments for this distinction are that many models from actual scientific
practice cannot be accommodated within the set-theoretical view of models (Downes 1992) and
that, while the semantic view aims to analyze all of science in terms of models, not all actual
scientific practice relies on the manipulation of models (Godfrey-Smith 2006, Weisberg 2007).
jungle, such as the relation between models and theories (e.g. the semantic
view, Giere 1988), models and discovery (Redhead 1980, Morrison and Mor-
gan 1999), models and laws of nature (Cartwright 1983, Giere 1999a) and mo-
dels and data (Suppes 1962, Harris 2003). Yet, no substantial attention has
been paid so far to the relation between models and hypotheses in science. The
main reason why this relation has been left unattended may have to do with the
fact that models and hypotheses are generally considered to belong to the jar-
gon of two mutually exclusive conceptions of the scientific method, i.e. the in-
ductive (model-based) view and the hypothetico-deductive view.3
In this paper, I investigate how hypotheses and models relate in actual mo-
del-based scientific practice, show that both are necessary concepts in under-
standing this practice, and show that they are mutually supportive. Apart from
touching upon recent debates in the literature on models, such as those con-
cerning the nature of their representational function and their construction, this
research will reinstate a modernized concept of a scientific hypothesis, in line
with model-based scientific practice, by shrugging off some of the unrealistic
intuitions with which it has been burdened by the old Popperian hypothetico-
deductive view.
After delineating my precise usage of the main concepts of this paper (Sec-
tion 2), I will identify four stances on the relation between hypotheses and mo-
dels  by examining the scattered remarks that have been made in the literature
and consider what objections might threaten these stances (Section 3). Then, I
will look into actual scientific practice and present three case studies to expo-
se the nature of the interplay between models and hypotheses (Section 4). This
will allow me to develop my own account of how hypotheses and their role
should be understood in the context of model-based science (Sections 5 and 6). 
2.  Some Conceptual Issues
Before I present the main arguments of this paper, some preliminaries about its
scope and topic are in order. More specifically, as ‘model’ and certainly ‘hypo-
thesis’ are often used as umbrella terms and as their meaning is often thought
to be more or less self-evident, I need to specify more precisely the kind of
hypotheses and models this paper will deal with. Unavoidably, this is a trade-
off between catching as much as possible of the actual usage of these concepts
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3 This position is advanced, for instance, in the article of Glass and Hall (2008) that I dis-
cuss in Section 3.3.
in scientific practice and defining sufficiently coherent concepts to allow for
analysis.
Scientific hypotheses. I take scientific hypotheses to be (1) statements (2)
about the empirical world (3) that have an unknown or underdetermined
truth status and (4) are advanced as a tentative answer to a particular re-
search question.
Let me expand on each part of this characterization. First, scientific hypothe-
ses are linguistic statements or propositions, by virtue of which it always ma-
kes sense to talk about their truth status. 
Second, this paper focuses only on hypotheses that make a reference to the
empirical world. This excludes, along with mathematical conjectures and me-
taphysical claims, also hypotheses that refer exclusively to parts of and rela-
tions within a particular model. Studying the internal properties of scientific
models is an important aspect of theoretical science, but conjectures of this kind
are generally not what scientists refer to with the notion ‘scientific hypothesis’.4
Third, although it makes sense to speak (typically in retrospect) of confir-
med hypotheses, it is assumed that hypotheses are not known to be true. Yet
this does not exclude that scientists can have a firm and even justified belief in
them, certainly in later stages of research. Also, I do not assume that hypothe-
ses are fully determined or have an unambiguous reference. As the case stu-
dies in this paper show, many actual hypotheses in early stages of research
unavoidably  have ambiguous or vague references. It is only afterwards, when
the conceptual apparatus, requisite models and governing conditions have
been developed in subsequent stages of research, that the intended hypothesis
can be formulated unambiguously. 
Finally, scientific hypotheses are not mere conjectural statements; they are
advanced in an attempt to answer particular research questions. In other words,
they are truth-purposive. Scientists advance them with the purpose of finding
the answer to a research question by trying to determine the suggested hypo-
theses’ truth value, even if they know that any particular hypothesis can be re-
jected or refined later on. Importantly, it is not required that hypotheses be com-
patible with the agent’s background knowledge: many valuable truth-purposive
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4 This relates to Contessa’s (2007) distinction between external sentences (e.g. “The emis-
sion spectrum of hydrogen can be calculated with the Bohr model”) and internal sentences (e.g.
“In the Bohr model of the atom, electrons orbit around the nucleus in well-defined orbits”). I
consider scientific hypotheses to be external, while internal sentences belong to the model itself
or a description of it.
hypotheses presented in history firmly contradicted large portions of the adop-
ted set of beliefs or (assumed) knowledge of those who suggested them. In such
cases, the agent thought that pursuing the truth value of the hypothesis he had
in mind might anyway lead to certain answers to his research question, even
when he was well aware that parts of his background knowledge would need
revision if this particular hypothesis turned out to be true.
With this final condition, I have excluded a large class of hypotheses from
my characterization of scientific hypotheses: explicit counterfactuals and be-
lief-negating hypotheses. Although these truth-denying hypotheses have their
role in science by virtue of, for instance, thought experiments (De Mey 2006),
I consider them fundamentally different from the truth-purposive hypotheses
this paper deals with, as (a) their truth value is explicitly known or believed to
be false and (b) they neither provide a direct answer to any particular question,
nor is it their suggestor’s aim to determine the hypothesis’ truth value (as he
already assumes it to be false). Their purpose is generally to set up a line of
reasoning that can lead to certain sought-for answers via a detour, such as a
thought experiment or a reductio ad absurdum argument.5
Scientific models. I take scientific models to be (1) abstract or concrete ar-
tifacts (2) purposefully created in order to be manipulated to perform par-
ticular scientific tasks (such as prediction or explanation) by exploiting cer-
tain representational relations.
Although this characterization is in line with much of the actual usage of the
notion ‘(scientific) model’ by scientists and in the contemporary literature on
models,6 I have made some restricting choices. 
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5 My distinction between truth-purposive and truth-denying hypotheses relates to Rescher’s
(1964) classic distinction between hypotheses with an unknown truth status, on the one hand, and
belief-negating hypotheses and counterfactuals, on the other. However, there is one caveat: Rescher
operates in a logical framework (which assumes logical omniscience). Therefore, for Rescher, it
makes no difference whether the agent explicitly believes (or knows) that the hypothesis is false,
or that this is only a consequence of his set of beliefs (or knowledge). For my purposes, this dis-
tinction does matter. A hypothesis is only truth-denying if the agent explicitly believes (or knows)
that it is false. When the agent thinks that it might be true, it is truth-purposive, even if it is in con-
tradiction with his set of beliefs (or knowledge). This situation actually occurs frequently in scien-
ce: as many problems are overdetermined, scientists are often willing to accept that part of their set
of beliefs (or assumed knowledge) is wrong in advancing a new hypothesis.
6 This characterization is inspired by, amongst others, the views of Giere (2004, 2010), Hu-
ghes (1997), Teller (2001), Bailer-Jones (2003), Nersessian (2008) and Knuuttila (2011) and fits
accounts of actual scientists reporting on their use of models (Bailer-Jones 2002).
First, ontologically, I consider models to be either concrete or abstract mo-
dels, yet my focus will be on the abstract type. It is commonly accepted that the
human imagination can create such things as abstract objects and that many
scientific models, such as the ideal pendulum or the Bohr model of the atom,
should be understood as such.7 As it is my purpose to determine the relation bet-
ween models and hypotheses, my analysis will unavoidably focus on abstract
models. In principle, this would exclude from the analysis any tangible model,
such as plastic models, diagrams, descriptive texts or annotated drawings. But
this should not unduly concern us, as we can straightforwardly interpret most
such tangible concrete models as representations of a particular abstract model,8
while tangible models used for the direct representation of real target pheno-
mena, such as a wooden bridge model, are not a part of our concern here. 
Second, functionally, I take models to be used to represent some target
system in the real (or empirical) world.9 This is what Giere (1999b) has called
the representational conception of models, as opposed to the instantial con-
ception of models used in the semantic and structuralist analysis of theories.
According to the representational conception, the intended representational re-
lations can be exploited for predictive or explanatory purposes by manipula-
ting the model. 
Finally, the target system the representation of which the model is used for
can also be a set of data points or measurements. Such models of data (Suppes
1962) or phenomenological models, which are generally constructed via stati-
stical methods of data analysis, are sometimes seen as temporary models re-
quiring further explanation by deeper explanatory or constitutive models (the
1885 Balmer formula for the hydrogen emission spectrum lines, for example,
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7 For the current debates on how this should be understood, see, amongst others, Godfrey-
Smith (2009), Giere (2009) and Contessa (2010) but also Teller (2001) or French (2010) for an
alternative position. 
8 Interpreting concrete or tangible models as representations of abstract models only makes
sense if one adopts a three-place analysis of the representation relation: representation is not pu-
rely a relation between a model M and a target T, but a relation of an agent S who uses a model
M to represent a target T for some purpose (Giere 2004). As such, concrete tangible models,
such as a double helix made from cardboard, can be used in two ways: either to represent di-
rectly a target phenomenon (actual DNA), or to represent an abstract model (the Crick and Wat-
son double-helix model), which is itself used to represent that same initial target (actual DNA).
Although the particular form in which an abstract model is represented does influence the scien-
tist’s actual manipulations (Knuuttila 2011, Vorms 2011), I will pay no further attention to indi-
vidual (tangible) models in the present paper.
9 This is a choice. Although this characterization fits large classes of models in science, it
does not fit all models (Downes 2011).
was explained by the 1913 Bohr model of the hydrogen atom). Yet, this type
of model is often employed in actual scientific practice, especially for predic-
tive purposes (consider, for instance, the importance of the discipline of data
analysis), and is highly esteemed by scientists with a strongly inductivist
mindset (see e.g. Glass and Hall in Section 3.3). Therefore, it is important that
our analysis of the relation between models and hypotheses should apply to
this type of model as well. 
3.  Four Stances on the Relation Between Models and Hypotheses
In this section I review four stances that can be found in the literature. Howe-
ver, it should be kept in mind that none of the authors I will associate with the-
se stances was explicitly concerned to specify the relation between hypotheses
and models. In each case, the characterization was embedded in a broader re-
search goal.
3.1.  Models Are (a Particular Form of) Hypotheses
and the Concepts Can Be Used Interchangeably
Although the stance that models are just a form of hypotheses is never expli-
citly articulated in the current literature, it is often implied by the fact that the
terms ‘model’ and ‘hypothesis’ are sometimes used more or less interchan-
geably. The idea is that models are just a particular form of hypotheses: they
are a bit more elaborate, and often have some figurative elements, but in es-
sence they are just hypothetical suggestions which can be tested to confirm
whether they conform to reality. This view is particularly appealing to people
focused on explanatory and mechanistic models, as for this kind of models it
is intended that the parts of the model should have an accurate one-to-one cor-
respondence relation with the parts of the target system.
This stance, however, neglects to take into account the important and cur-
rently hot issue of the representational relation between models and the
world.10 The representational relation between hypotheses and the world is ra-
ther straightforward to specify: hypotheses are linguistic entities. Therefore,
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10 See also footnote 8. For a discussion about the representational relation between models and
the world see Van Fraassen (1980, 2008), Giere (1989, 2010), Knuuttila (2010) and Downes
(2011). 
whether they represent the world can be indicated by stating whether they are
true or false. But models are not linguistic entities.11 Therefore, one cannot de-
termine whether a model is literally true or false. When a model is called true
(or false), this attribution normally has to be understood in a metaphorical or
pragmatic sense: it indicates that the model meets the purpose for which it was
designed, such as accurate prediction or explanatory power, not that it consists
of literally true sentences.12 Even if one replaces truth with a gradual notion
such as accuracy, it makes for some models no sense to assess whether or not
they are accurate, because they were never intended to be so because of their
use of idealizations, simplifications and fictional entities. 
Finally, one might suggest that, although models are maybe not linguistic
in nature and hypotheses are, they might still be interchangeable if every mo-
del would have a full characterization that is purely defined in linguistic terms
(and which could, hence, act as the hypothesis of this model). After all, many
models in science are known purely from a textual description, and Craver
(2006) has introduced in the mechanism literature the notion of the ideally
complete description of a mechanism as the ideal for a mechanistic model. Let
us grant this for a moment, and assume that there exists for each model in
science an ideal fully characterizing and fully linguistic description. Such a de-
scription of a model would indeed have a truth value. But it would be true only
by reference to the model itself. If we were to determine its truth value by re-
ference to the world, it would always be false. Models include fictitious enti-
ties (e.g. point masses or frictionless planes) or describe unreal and simplified
conditions (e.g. no air resistance or uniform mass density) and even if a model
is very descriptive, as are particular mechanism models in biology, its (ideally)
full description would be false by reference to the world because of the sim-
plifications and abstractions it incorporates.13 For instance, the description
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11 There is a minority position that does take models literally as linguistic entities. This
view, which is embedded in a syntactic view of theories, takes models (just like theories) to be
a set of statements about a target system, simplified or idealized for certain purposes (Achin-
stein 1968, Redhead 1980). This position, however, has to cope with similar concerns as the
syntactic view of theories. Moreover, it faces the obvious objection that there can be many dif-
ferent linguistic descriptions of the same model. How should the canonical description be de-
termined? As a matter of fact, I have found no recent adherents of this position.
12 Mäki (2011) has, however, tried to define a literal truth relation for models (see also Pe-
rini 2005 on the possibility of such a truth relation for pictorial representations), but, in essen-
ce, Mäki’s proposal boils down to defining the truth of a model as the truth of the assertion that
the driving mechanism of the model is the same as its target mechanism (which makes him ra-
ther fit the stance discussed in Section 3.2). 
13 See also Niiniluoto (2012, 2013) about the verisimilitude of models. 
might state that one part is directly adjacent to another part, while in reality
there are blood vessels, tissues and fat cells in between. Or, turning the argu-
ment around, if the ideally full description of a model were to be completely
true with respect to the world, there would be no model defined, as the de-
scription would be just a direct description of this part of the world. We can
conclude that if such a thing as the (ideally) full description of a model exi-
sted, it would be literally false with respect to the world and, hence, counter-
factual.14 Therefore, if we were to use this construction to call models hypo-
theses, they would be truth-denying hypothesis and not truth-purposive hypo-
theses, as their creators had likely intended.15
3.2.  Hypotheses Are Statements about the Relation Between
Fully Interpreted Models and their Target Systems
This is the idea Giere has been arguing for since his book Explaining Science:
A Cognitive Approach (1988). According to him, (theoretical) hypotheses
(which, he claims, overlap considerably with the use of the notion by scientists
themselves) are assertions of some sort of relationship between a model and
the system it is intended to represent. In his more recent work (2004, 2008,
2010), Giere specifies this notion of hypotheses further, holding that hypothe-
ses are claims that a fully specified and interpreted model (a model of which
each element is provided with a physical interpretation) fits a particular real
system more or less well, or any generalization of such claims.
If one has come to appreciate that the relation between models and the
world is not simply a matter of truth (or falsehood), but may include a plenitu-
de of possible representational relations depending on the purposes of the
agent, it is quite natural to understand scientific hypotheses as specifications of
the nature and fit of these representational relations. For instance, many hypo-
theses state that the values calculated using a particular model fit particular
measurements of the target system of the model (within certain error margins),
or that the mechanism represented by a particular simplified and idealized mo-
del is the same mechanism driving a real target system. Perhaps because it is
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14 This analysis relates to the analysis of the falsehood of models by Cartwright (1983) and
Wimsatt (2007[1987]).
15 An exception to the general idea that modelers aim to be truth-purposive might be toy
models, which are purposefully built not to represent much but rather to experiment with the
theoretical tools themselves. Toy models could also be characterized as counterfactuals, and al-
low, therefore, for analysis both as models and as thought experiments.
natural to understand hypotheses in this bridging role, I have found no dissen-
ting voices on this issue amongst scholars working on scientific models.
However, although this analysis is compelling and very suitable to account
for a number of hypotheses used in actual scientific practice, it does not fit the
majority of hypotheses advanced and defended in this practice. The reason for
this is actually straightforward. Giere’s characterization of a hypothesis de-
pends on the existence of a model that can be fully interpreted. This means that
this kind of hypotheses can be stated only once a fully interpretable model has
been developed, which is typically only in the closing stages of the discovery
process. Giere is not to blame for this. His project is to analyze how accom-
plished science is structured—the starting point of his 1988 investigation was
a mechanics text book. But if we want to understand the role of hypotheses in
scientific practice, we should take into account that hypotheses are much mo-
re closely linked to the discovery process than to the presentation of well-esta-
blished science. In the process of scientific discovery, advanced hypotheses
are seldom well-specified and fully interpretable (as the case studies in the
next section show). 
Therefore, although we can use Giere’s account for a subclass of scientific
hypotheses, i.e. the fully interpretable hypotheses (see section 5), we must
complement it with an account of hypotheses used in the actual process of
scientific discovery.
3.3.  Radical Inductionism: Hypotheses Should be Avoided
in Model Construction 
Recently, Glass and Hall (2008) launched a well-argued attack in the top-ran-
ked journal Cell on the use of hypotheses in scientific practice. The use of
hypotheses, they argue, is a relic from the old hypothetico-deductive perspec-
tive on science, which denied induction as a valid form of reasoning. Accor-
ding to them, the latest articulation of this obsolete view, Popper’s Critical Ra-
tionalism, has been successfully challenged in the second half of the 20th cen-
tury by, amongst others, Kuhn, while probability and Bayesianism gave the
inductivist better tools to defend his position. 
Apart from summarizing the main historical and philosophical positions in
this well-known debate, Glass and Hall also argue on a pragmatic level that
scientists would do better to replace top-down hypothesis testing with bottom-
up inductive model-building. Framing research by hypotheses adds severe bia-
ses. Not only are negatives less valued than positives (confirmation bias), but
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also researchers are rendered blind to alternative routes, as negatives are not
differentiated (categorization bias). Furthermore, not all interesting research
(or research proposals) can be framed by a hypothesis. A telling example was
the Human Genome Project, of which, when pressed to state a research hypo-
thesis, J. Craig Venter, a major player in the project, stated that “It is our hypo-
thesis that this approach will be successful” (Glass 2006, p. 18). 
Therefore, Glass and Hall suggest that research (and research proposals)
would better start by asking an open research question, after which data col-
lection could begin. From this data, which is more and more abundant and ela-
borated in this Era of Big Data, the methods of statistical data analysis might
extract a first model, which would lead to new questions, further data gathe-
ring and model refinement. Nowhere should one, according to this view, have
to introduce unproven premises or hypotheses. 
Glass and Hall’s argument has the merit that it points out to scientists and
funding organizations the danger of bias if research hypotheses are given too
much weight. In fact, their suggestion to frame research proposals by open re-
search questions instead of hypotheses (as is sometimes required by funding
agencies) is an interesting one, but, philosophically, their suggestion to lite-
rally eradicate all hypotheses from scientific practice in favor of model-buil-
ding cannot be taken seriously.
First, hypotheses are (implicitly) present at all stages of inductive model-
building. Even when the research project is framed by a research question,
choices will have to be made as to which variables should be tested for in ob-
taining the first data set. And such choices rely on (hidden) assumptions about
which variables are plausible and which are not. For instance, if one is looking
for the causal factors and catalysts of a particular disease, the data set will pro-
bably contain variables such as air quality or the diet or medical history of the
test subjects, but not whether they are left- or right-handed or what their favo-
rite ice cream topping is. These decisions as to which variables to include rely
on initial hypotheses concerning what might plausibly be factors in the inve-
stigated disease.
Further, inductive model-building or statistical data analysis is a discipline
crucially dependent on the introduction of assumptions to mold vast data sets
into models that can be manipulated for scientific purposes. The discipline has
been described as being “more an art, or even a bag of tricks, than science”
(Good 1983). An often cited and telling example is the curve-fitting problem:
given the simplest data set of only two variables, there are already an infinity
of fitting mathematical functions. Data analysts constantly have to make deci-
sions (based on assumptions) on how to handle outliers, on the tradeoff bet-
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ween simplicity and data fitting, on how the data is best represented (as this
influences model construction), on how the variable is spread in the popula-
tion (is it normally distributed or not?), and so on.
Finally, Glass and Hall’s analysis is very focused on scientific experimen-
tation, and their generalization is based on the old inductive idea that the whole
process of scientific discovery can be reduced to inferences from data. It was
precisely against this view that Nickles (1980) and other philosophers of scien-
tific discovery have argued: discovery, they hold, is not separate from theore-
tical considerations and choices. As the examples in the next section will show,
many models originate from theoretical considerations. Only later on, when
sufficient detail is attained, can they be compared with experimental data or
models of data. 
However, Glass and Hall’s analysis is not completely without value as their
analysis does (largely) apply to the models of data and phenomenological mo-
dels mentioned above. It does, however, not apply to explanatory or constitu-
tive models about which the literature on models in science generally talks. To
them is the burden to argue how this latter kind of models could be construc-
ted without hypotheses.
3.4.  Heuristic View: Hypotheses are Necessary
Guidelines in Model Construction
A view opposite to the previous stance is that hypotheses somehow have a heu-
ristic and methodological role in the process of model construction. Although
this idea is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Nola and Sankey 2007, p. 25), it is mo-
re often implicitly assumed. In the remainder of this paper, I will give an ex-
plicit account of this stance, which could then complement the second position
to give a full analysis of the relation between models and hypotheses. 
In my view, heuristic hypotheses are direct attempts to initially answer the
research question, but, precisely because the research still needs to be done,
they unavoidably contain vague filler terms or black boxes and can do little
more than hint at a particular direction of research. Yet, by this hinting they
sketch an outline or rough blueprint, or even maybe just identify the type of
the model(s) needed to substantiate the initial hypothesis. As such, they redu-
ce the initial research problem to the more specific problem of filling in the
black boxes of the model outline, resulting finally in an adequate model, of
which a fully specified and interpreted hypothesis (in Giere’s sense, see sec-
tion 3.2), if confirmed, can provide an answer to the initial research question.
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Before I give a detailed account of this position in Sections 5 and 6, I will
first present in Section 4 three case studies that will allow me to benchmark
this analysis.
4.  Three Cases from Astronomy
In this section, I introduce three historical cases that illustrate my analysis of
the role of hypotheses in model-based science. Due to space restrictions, only
the first case will be fully elaborated; for the other two cases, only the key
steps in my analysis will be indicated, together with further references to the
literature.
4.1.  The Energy Source of the Stars (1920-1930s)16
Around 1920, the source of stellar energy was still a mystery. By that time, Ed-
dington had crafted the basic structural model of a (stable) star, largely confir-
med by the observations at the time. His model represented stars as spheres of
gas in which, at each internal point, there was an equilibrium between the in-
ward gravitational pressure and the outward gas and radiation pressure, resul-
ting in concentric layers of increasingly lower pressures and temperatures to-
wards the surface.
But the source of the stellar radiant energy was still a mystery. Clearly, it
could not be the result of a chemical reaction, such as exothermic oxidation (fi-
re). Even if the Sun would be totally composed of carbon, its mass would be
barely enough to radiate the Sun’s current luminosity for a few thousand years.
To solve this problem, von Helmholtz and Kelvin had defended in the 19th cen-
tury what was later referred to as the contraction hypothesis, which was in turn
inspired by the nebular hypothesis for the origin of our solar system by Kant
and Laplace.17 Von Helmholtz and Kelvin took as the source of stellar energy
the inward gravitational energy provided, at first, during the accretion of the
star and, after it has started to radiate, by the contraction of the star as it cools
down. Using this model, Kelvin estimated the age of the solar system to be on
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16 For a thorough and detailed version of this history, see Shiaviv (2010). For a good intro-
duction see Bahcall (2000) or Mazumdar (2005).
17 This hypothesis situates the origin of our solar system in the gravitational collapse of a
gaseous nebula (Kant 2012[1755]).
the order of ten million years—in contradiction to estimates based on the bio-
logical and geological record. For instance, Darwin suggested in the Origin of
Species, based on some geological calculations, that the Earth was at least
three hundred million years old, the time he thought to be necessary for the
evolution of our current biodiversity.18 As a matter of fact, this whole situation
led to a public controversy between these two leading scientists.
At the dawn of the 20th century, better geological observations and the dis-
covery of radioactivity quickly discredited the contraction model. The Earth
(and, hence, the Sun) must be older than Kelvin’s estimate. Therefore, the con-
traction model could not supply the requisite energy. Many looked at the new
physics that was emerging, hoping it could provide an answer. Rutherford and
the young Eddington suggested that radioactive elements might be the source
of stellar energy, and Jeans, upon learning of Einstein’s E = mc2, suggested that
in the extremely hot interior of stars, protons and electrons might annihilate
each other, turning their mass into energy. 
The experimental breakthrough that led to Eddington’s initial suggestion of
nuclear fusion was Ashton’s measurements of the mass of He and H nuclei,
finding that the mass of a He nucleus was only 99,3% of the combined mass
of the four hydrogen nuclei it contained. This led Eddington to the hypothesis
of nuclear fusion:
Now mass cannot be annihilated, and the deficit can only represent the
mass of the electrical energy set free in the transmutation. [...] If 5 per
cent of a star’s mass consists initially of hydrogen atoms, which are gra-
dually being combined to form more complex elements, the total heat li-
berated will more than suffice for our demands, and we need look no
further for the source of a star’s energy. (Eddington 1920, p. 353)
This suggestion, although defended fiercely, is clearly just a hypothesis. Apart
from Ashton’s measurements, he had little or no evidence to back it up, nor did
he understand how and when such a fusion process might occur. After all, one
should not forget that at the time, neither the neutron nor any nucleus of ato-
mic mass 2 or 3 had yet been discovered. Quantum mechanics had not yet been
developed and the amount of hydrogen in the Sun was not yet determined. So,
Eddington’s hypothesis suggested that somehow four protons and two elec-
trons (which it was thought, at the time, the He nucleus consisted of) come to-
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18 At the moment, it is widely accepted that the age of our solar system is approximately 4.6
billion years old, while the earliest evidence of life on Earth is about 3.5 billion years old.
gether at one position at a given time, something which Eddington knew was
probabilistically nearly impossible, as is illustrated by the following quote:
Indeed the formation of helium is necessarily so mysterious that we dis-
trust all predictions as to the conditions required. [...] How the neces-
sary materials of 4 mutually repelling protons and 2 electrons can be ga-
thered together in one spot, baffles imagination. (Eddington 1926, p.
301) 
Therefore, it is understandable that throughout the 1920s his hypothesis still
met with competitors: Jeans kept defending a proton-electron annihilation,
while Bohr even thought that in stars the conservation of energy was viola-
ted.19 It was only after numerous contributions of the likes of Gamov, Houter-
man, Atkinson and Weizsäcker that Bethe (1939) finally put forward a model
of stellar energy production in satisfactory agreement with the observational
record, which consisted of two well-described processes that converted hydro-
gen into helium: the p-p chain and the CNO cycle (the latter occurring only in
stars more massive than the Sun).
Let us review the various characteristics of Eddington’s hypothesis of nu-
clear fusion. Clearly, it fits our characterization: it is a claim about the world
with an unknown truth value in answer to a particular research question. In
fact, it would be better to state that its truth value is underdetermined. Ed-
dington had no idea how energy could be liberated by combining atoms. The-
re are many possible models—some even totally different from Bethe’s model
with completely different concepts, elements and forces—that could still be
seen as a specification of Eddington’s hypothesis.20
Still, the credit that Eddington received for this suggestion is justified, as
his suggestion was immensely important in redirecting research. In a sense, it
simplified the problem of what the source of stellar energy was to the question
of how hydrogen nuclei can combine so as to form helium nuclei, a process in-
volving entities that could also be studied in laboratories on Earth. This sim-
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19 Bohr’s suggestion (1986[1929]) to renounce energy conservation must be linked primor-
dially with the problem of the continuous β spectrum (Gauderis 2014), but the way in which
Bohr combined it with this problem of astrophysics, a field to which he has not contributed at
all, shows how pressing the problem of stellar energy still was around 1930.
20 Consider, for instance, also the briefly mentioned nebular hypothesis. Our current model
of the origin of our solar system differs completely from what Kant had in mind (Kant
2012[1755], Palmquist 1987). Still, our current model for the origin of our solar system can be
seen as a specification of Kant’s severely underdetermined original hypothesis.
plification is achieved by providing an initial answer to the question of stellar
energy, using a sketchy outline of a stellar model containing a black box pro-
cess that somehow turns present hydrogen into helium. This is why his idea
was so hugely important and why he kept on defending it and urging research
in that direction for twenty years, until, finally, Bethe was able to crack open
the black box. 
So what is the nature of the relation here between model and hypothesis?
Eddington’s model was largely a black box or at most a rough outline, so Gie-
re’s characterization of hypotheses does not apply to his hypothesis, because
Eddington’s model could not be fully specified or provided with a physical in-
terpretation. His hypothesis was heuristic in nature. Only once Bethe’s model
was available could one say that Eddington’s hypothesis, refined by stating
that the “combination of hydrogen atoms” has to occur according to Bethe’s
model, is a hypothesis in Giere’s sense: a claim that a fully interpreted model
fits a target system.
4.2.  The Nice Model (2000s)
In 2001, simulations of the model specified by the nebular hypothesis (descri-
bing the origin of our solar system), with reasonable assumptions for the initial
conditions, confirmed the idea raised a few years earlier that Neptune could not
have become such a large planet at such a great distance from the Sun (Stewart
& Levison 1998, Levison & Stewart 2001)—a research problem that triggered,
amongst other possible solutions, the hypothesis that Neptune initially formed
nearer to the Sun and then migrated out (Thommes et al. 1999). Yet this hypo-
thesis was nearly meaningless, as no available model showed how such a mi-
gration could have occurred. In 2005, in a series of three papers in Nature, the
Nice model21 was presented (Tsiganis et al. 2005, Morbidelli et al. 2005, Go-
mes et al. 2005). This model postulates that four billion years ago there was a
period in which Jupiter and Saturn were in 2:1 orbital resonance.22 This led to
a global gravitational instability in our solar system that caused the outer pla-
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21 This model, named after the French Mediterranean city where the research was conduc-
ted, is generally represented and explored via computer simulations. It is yet an open debate how
models and simulations relate. See among others Humphreys (2004), Frigg and Reiss (2009),
Wins berg (2010).
22 This means that one orbit of Saturn takes exactly as long as two orbits of Jupiter. Hence,
the direction where they line up (with respect to the Sun) and coerce their combined gravitatio-
nal pull on the rest of the solar system, remained the same for several thousands of years.
nets to move from orbits much nearer to the Sun outwards to their current tra-
jectories. Furthermore, simulations of this model showed that it also explained
many other curious features of our solar system, such as the Late Heavy Bom-
bardment (that caused the many lunar craters), the heavy eccentricities of the
outer planets’ orbits, and the Trojan satellites locked in Jupiter’s orbit. In sub-
sequent years, improved simulations and new explanations of further features
of the solar system, such as the characteristics of the Kuiper belt, have made
the Nice Model generally accepted (Crida 2009).
The Nice model is clearly a very different type of model than the stellar
model from Section 4.1. Where the stellar model was mainly a very general
theoretical model applicable to any star, the Nice model is an applied model
tailored to our solar system, established by numerous computer simulations, in
which mainly the initial conditions were sought that, given the principles of a
well-known theory (Newtonian dynamics), could result in the observed speci-
ficities of our solar system. 
Still, we find here the same type of relation between the model and the heu-
ristic hypothesis that led to its development. The initial suggestion, i.e. that
Neptune formed closer to the Sun and then migrated out due to gravitational
forces in our solar system, provided a first tentative but direct answer to the re-
search question of why Neptune was so massive. Yet, this suggestion was lar-
gely vacuous without an exact model or initial conditions to specify how such
a migration might have occurred. On the other hand, it was precisely the per-
suasive plausibility of this initial heuristic hypothesis that motivated and coor-
dinated a large research effort to conduct the numerous computer simulations
that led to the substantiation of this claim by explicating the unknown mecha-
nism of Neptune’s migration. Only now that this model has been built can we
reformulate the hypothesis as a fully interpretable hypothesis in Giere’s sense:
Neptune formed closer to the Sun and then migrated out according to the con-
ditions and the mechanism described by the Nice model.
4.3.  Dark Matter (1930s-Present)23
Notwithstanding some earlier references to dark stars or matter, the start of the
modern search for dark matter is to be found in Zwicky (2009[1933]). Having
found that the galaxies in the Coma Cluster rotate way too high around their
center to be explained by the gravitational forces of the visible stars, he sug-
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23 Classic histories of dark matter are Trimble (1987), Van den Bergh (1999), Rubin (2003).
gested that dynamical models of galaxies should incorporate the presence of
non-visible dark matter to explain the observed rotational speeds. In the follo-
wing decades, the problem was largely cast aside, although a growing number
of studies for different galaxies confirmed the high rotational speeds. Gra-
dually, more galactic models incorporating dark matter were advanced, attri-
buting more and more features to it. For instance, Ostriker and Peebles (1973)
calculated that, in contrast with visible matter which is mostly found in the ga-
lactic disk, dark matter is mostly present in the galactic halo. The enumeration
of the various indications of its existence in a highly-influential review paper
of Faber and Galagher (1979) convinced most astrophysicists of its existence
by 1980. In subsequent decades, we saw an enormous increase in the number
of suggestions to characterize dark matter, while some possibilities, such as
neutrinos or brown dwarfs and other massive dark astronomical bodies (so-
called MACHOs), could already be ruled out. At the same time, other hypothe-
ses have been raised to address the initial problem of the galactic rotation cur-
ves (e.g. the MOND hypothesis proposed a modification of Newtonian dyna-
mics), but we also saw an increase in the use of the concept ‘dark matter’ in
models that explain other features of our galaxy, such as gravitational lensing
or fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation. Nowadays, the fact that the
concept is incorporated in virtually any successful galactic or cosmological
model is considered by almost everyone to be sufficient proof of its existence.
On the other hand, although some possibilities have already been ruled out and
some characteristics have already been determined, there is still no satisfactory
account of the nature of dark matter. The best guess at present is that it con-
sists of unknown weakly interacting massive particles (so-called WIMPs).
This final case, about a not yet specified hypothetical entity, might seem
different from the other two cases. Yet, also here we can find the same inter-
play between hypotheses and models, the only difference being that, in this ca-
se, most of our present models cannot be fully interpreted and specified (in
Giere’s sense), as dark matter is not yet fully understood. Zwicky’s initial heu-
ristic hypothesis, i.e. that there exists a large amount of dark matter in galaxies,
has, despite its neglect at the time it was proposed, redirected much research
toward specifying the nature of this unknown type of matter and supplemen-
ting this claim with suitable models. But, although galactic and cosmological
models including dark matter have been substantially refined over the years
and have become the only widely accepted models, and even if these models
can be operationalized for some explanatory or predictive purposes, the notion
‘dark matter’ still remains something of a black box in these models. 
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5.  Heuristic and Fully Interpretable Hypotheses
Before turning to the relation between models and hypotheses in model-based
scientific practice, let me first draw more precisely the distinction I have been
hinting at between two types of hypotheses: heuristic hypotheses and fully in-
terpretable hypotheses, a distinction that draws on Craver’s (2006) distinction
between mechanism sketches and ideally complete descriptions of mecha-
nisms.24
A fully interpretable hypothesis is a hypothesis the meaning of which (or
any part of which) leaves no room for vagueness or ambiguity. In other words,
expressions of such hypotheses do not contain any unexplained filler terms,
terms such as ‘process,’ ‘to interact,’ or ‘entity’ that have a broad and generic
meaning covering up some uncertainty, imprecision or unknown details.25
Hence, these hypotheses are fully expressed in terms with a precise meaning,
which is provided either by the conceptual framework of the field the resear-
cher is working in, or by the researcher himself by means of suitable models.
Heuristic hypotheses, on the other hand, do contain such unspecified and ge-
neric filler terms.26
The main idea is that heuristic hypotheses are both unavoidable and useful
in the early stages of scientific discovery, as they sketch an early blueprint or
incomplete model without committing one to too much (yet unknown) detail.
A heuristic hypothesis suggests that research should proceed in a particular di-
rection, i.e. that it aims to fill gaps in the incomplete model instead of trying
to address the general research question directly. Fully interpretable hypothe-
ses, on the other hand, can be put forward only after the construction of a full
model that specifies how the hypothesis (which is a claim about a part of rea-
lity) should be interpreted precisely and under what conditions it should hold.
Therefore, in principle, it is possible to design a conclusive experiment to ve-
rify whether a fully interpretable hypothesis holds, while heuristic hypotheses
can seldom be tested conclusively due to their vagueness and ambiguity. Ex-
periments in this case mostly aim to refine the model and reduce the vague-
ness and ambiguity. 
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24 The notion of a mechanism sketch had already been introduced in the seminal paper on
mechanisms by Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000).
25 This does not mean that the hypothesis cannot contain any approximations or abstrac-
tions.
26 Heuristic hypotheses are, however, still real truth-conductive hypotheses, which aim to
provide directly answers to particular research questions.
Before I add some further remarks and consider some examples, it is use-
ful first to explain how these two types of hypotheses relate. As the main cri-
terion that distinguishes these two types is the amount of precision in the ex-
pression of the hypotheses, the two distinguished types are actually the extre-
mes of a continuum. Moreover, as it is an unwieldy (if even possible) task to
specify all relevant conditions for a particular hypothesis, it is clear that the
idea of a fully interpretable hypothesis is actually an idealization (as Craver
could only speak of ideally complete descriptions of mechanisms). Therefore,
at first sight, it seems as if there exist only heuristic hypotheses, interpretable
to a greater or lesser extent. In scientific practice, however, some hypotheses
are clearly considered to be sufficiently unambiguous and interpretable, allo-
wing them to be tested conclusively. Therefore, for our purposes, we can evade
this conclusion by allowing for a pragmatic or social epistemological threshold
of precision sufficient for full interpretability. A hypothesis can be considered
sufficiently fully interpretable if it invokes no disagreement in the research
community as to which is its meaning. Yet the flip side of adopting this social
epistemological criterion is that a single researcher cannot himself decide whe-
ther a hypothesis is fully interpretable. Also, that a particular hypothesis is
considered to be fully interpretable at a certain point in time does not warrant
that it will remain so in the indefinite future.
A few further remarks are in order concerning the concept of filler terms,
including some examples. First, what counts as a filler term is topic dependent.
For instance, the phrase ‘exerting a force’ has a precise meaning in physics,
while in economics this would be a filler term for an unspecified process of in-
fluence. Having said this, the fact that so many words in various fields can be
considered to have a precise meaning is precisely because of the cumulative
processes of abstraction and concept formation in these sciences. Therefore,
whether a phrase counts as a filler term or whether it has a precise meaning (in
a particular reference framework) is dependent on the stage of development in
the field. Let me return to the examples presented in Section 4. When Edding-
ton in 1920 spoke of “the combination of hydrogen atoms” and somewhat la-
ter even used the term ‘nuclear energy,’ these concepts were certainly filler
terms. Despite having good arguments why focusing on a possible transition
from nuclear mass to energy could possibly solve the problem of stellar
energy, he did not have any account of how this energy could be released
from the nucleus and why this process occurred in stars. It was only after the
acceptance of Bethe’s 1939 nuclear fusion models for the pp-cycle and CNO-




Also, filler terms generally gain precision only gradually. For instance,
while the concept ‘dark matter’ was at first a pure filler term to indicate the
possibility of unobserved but present matter, the term has gained some preci-
sion and delineation over the past decades. It is now accepted that dark matter
mostly resides in galactic halos, that there is at least five times more dark mat-
ter than regular matter, that it consists of weakly interacting massive unknown
particles (WIMPs), which move at relatively slow speeds (with respect to the
speed of light) and which are electrically neutral, etc. Yet no astronomer at pre-
sent would claim that the concept of dark matter is fully understood and pre-
cisely defined. 
Finally, the given examples might suggest that in the discovery process fil-
ler terms themselves always gain a more precise meaning. This happens, such
as in the case of ‘nuclear energy’ or ‘dark matter’, but more often vague filler
terms are replaced with more meaningful descriptions, names or acronyms,
such as ‘nuclear fusion’ or ‘WIMP’.
So how do these hypotheses relate to models? For fully interpretable hypo-
theses, as indicated in Section 3.2, I follow Giere in the sense that such hypo-
theses are claims that a fully specified model provided with a physical inter-
pretation fits a target system more or less well. This idea can now be extended
to heuristic hypotheses. Heuristic hypotheses are also claims that a particular
model or model type fits a target system more or less well, but in this case, as
the models are just bare model sketches containing black boxes labeled by fil-
ler terms, this claim should be understood as the weaker claim that a full spe-
cification and interpretation of the model sketch that would fit the target
system is possible. But in providing such a model sketch, the initial research
question is already partially answered, while at the same time the direction is
shown for future research, i.e. to fill in the black boxes.
6.  The Role of Hypotheses in Model-Based Scientific Practice
Let me now spell out the role of these two types of hypotheses in the process
of scientific discovery in model-based science. This view will incorporate the
two theses I defended above, i.e. that hypotheses are necessary in the process
of model construction and that hypotheses that are not fully interpretable are
valuable and even needed in this process. 
In general, research aimed at constructing models is triggered by a research
question or trigger. In her monograph on abductive reasoning (the inference
from observations to explanatory hypotheses), Aliseda (2006) distinguishes
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between anomalies and novelties as the two types of observational triggers for
abductive reasoning. This classification can be adopted for our current purpo-
ses if we keep in mind the main criticism developed by Nickles (1980) and
other scholars of scientific discovery against the idea that abductive reasoning
could be the logic of scientific discovery (as suggested by Hanson 1958), i.e.
that abductive reasoning  neglects the triggering role of theory in scientific dis-
covery. Much research is fueled by theoretical considerations, but also here we
can distinguish between questions triggered by contradictions (related to ex-
perimental anomalies) and questions triggered by lacunas (related to experi-
mental novelties). Therefore, I conceive of four triggers for research aiming at
the construction of models: experimental (or observational) novelties, experi-
mental (or observational) anomalies, theoretical gaps or lacunas and theoreti-
cal contradictions.
In model-based discovery, these triggers or research questions are answe-
red at the end of the research process by proposing a model and claiming that
its similarities with the target system can be exploited to sufficiently address
the research question, or, in other words, by stating a (sufficiently) interpreta-
ble hypothesis whose claim is sufficiently verified.
As the model is only linked to the trigger or research question through a
hypothesis claiming its fit, such a linking hypothesis, constituting the (partial)
answer to the research question, must be present through all stages of model
construction; though in the early stages it will heuristic in nature, not fully in-
terpretable. 
Now we have to investigate what the role of these heuristic hypotheses is
in the research process itself. If we take a constraints-based view of scientific
discovery, the view Nickles (1978) developed in the tradition of scientific re-
search as problem solving, we can conceive of a scientific problem (or re-
search question) as a set of constraints. Progressing on a problem consists in
manipulating these constraints such that the problem turns into a simpler pro-
blem or a problem that is easier to solve. 
In the case of suggesting a heuristic hypothesis as an initial partial answer
to a research problem, one deliberately adds a constraint: however vague a
heuristic hypothesis might be, it excludes particular solutions and direct re-
search in a particular direction. As such, one progresses on the problem by re-
ducing it to a simpler problem, though always at the risk that one will not find
a solution along these lines (if the heuristic hypothesis turns out to have been
a wrong path from the start). After reducing the initial research problem to the
simpler problem of finding a suitable model to fill in the filler terms, the heu-
ristic hypothesis remains important as the link between the reduced problem
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and the initial research question, as it shows how the latter can be answered by
means of the answer to the reduced problem.
Let me illustrate this role of heuristic hypotheses with some of the cases of
Section 4. Eddington reduced the open problem of stellar energy (a theoretical
gap) to the more restricted problem of how hydrogen could combine so as to
form helium. After the problem was reduced to finding a suitable model for
this combination, Eddington’s hypothesis remained the link that allowed the
answer to this reduced problem, namely Bethe’s model of hydrogen fusion, to
be used to answer the initial research question of where stellar energy origina-
ted. By the time Bethe’s  model was developed, Eddington’s hypothesis could
be considered a fully interpretable hypothesis.
Similarly, the research question of the improbable accretion of Neptune (an
observational anomaly) was reduced by the initial heuristic hypothesis to the
more straightforward problem of constructing a model and determining the
initial conditions for an outward-directed gravitational slingshot of a planet
within our solar system. Only when such a model—the Nice model—was con-
structed through numerous computer simulations could the original hypothesis
that Neptune initially formed much closer to the Sun and migrated outwards be
considered as the fully interpretable answer to the initial research question or
trigger. 
A final thing to address is the fact that many research triggers have the form
of an anomaly or a contradiction. Heuristic hypotheses addressing such re-
search questions unavoidably sometimes contradict major parts of the agent’s
(assumed) background knowledge. Yet as history shows, this clearly does not
prevent scientists from coming up with heuristic hypotheses for such overde-
termined problems. In such cases, scientists reason according to what Rescher
(1960) has called belief-negating (or even knowledge-negating) hypothetical
reasoning: they assume the hypothesis while retaining all beliefs from their be-
lief set that are compatible with it, and suspending judgment on beliefs that are
contradictory to it. For instance, in the case of Neptune, researchers had at first
to suspend judgment on the idea that the planets in our solar system were for-
med where we observe them today, while retaining acceptance of full Newto-
nian dynamics. The beliefs compatible with the heuristic hypothesis then be-
come the basis for solving the reduced problem of the construction of a suita-
ble model to interpret this heuristic hypothesis. Only once the model is verified
and the research question answered, the initially incompatible beliefs on which
judgment was suspended can then be revised.
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7.  Conclusion
In this article I have addressed the relation between models and hypotheses in
model-based science. After reviewing and pointing out the shortcomings of va-
rious stances in the literature, I presented my own view on the matter.
First, a distinction has to be made between heuristic hypotheses and fully
interpretable hypotheses. Heuristic hypotheses are initial and partial answers
to research questions that contain necessarily vague filler terms, yet sketch the
outline for the type of model that might be needed to answer the research que-
stion. Fully interpretable hypotheses, on the other hand, are claims concerning
how a fully constructed model can be used to provide an answer to the research
question.
Next, I have shown in this article, by examining three cases from astro-
nomy, how initial heuristic hypotheses fuel the process of model construction
and how, once the requisite models are built, they gradually evolve into fully
interpretable hypotheses that can, if verified, serve as answers to the initial re-
search questions.
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